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SEC ENFORCEMENT OF ATI'ORNEY UP-THE-LADDER REPORTING
RULES: AN ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS,
NORMS AND BIASES
MICHAEL A. PERINO*
I. INTRODUCTION
IN their paper' and in their earlier comments to the SEC on the pro-
posed attorney reporting rules, 2 Professors Cramton, Cohen and
Koniak do an excellent job recounting the genesis of the attorney report-
ing requirements in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, describing the SEC's pro-
posed and final rules and critiquing the rule's triggering mechanism and
now apparently shelved noisy withdrawal requirement. Their case study of
the recent Spiegel, Inc. independent examiner's report3 is a particularly
useful vehicle for examining the practical implications of the SEC's policy
and drafting choices. Although I was a member of a committee that sub-
mitted comments opposed to noisy withdrawal, 4 there is much in their
paper with which I agree. Specifically, given that the corporation is the
client, it is hard to argue against up-the-ladder reporting. I would also
agree that the triggering mechanism as adopted is difficult to apply; al-
though, as I explain later, I think there may be a rational explanation for
why the SEC chose that particular articulation. 5 While I disagree with
Professors Cramton, Cohen and Koniak on the wisdom of mandating
* Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. The author would
like to thank John Barrett, Rob Vischer and Cheryl Wade for helpful comments
and suggestions. Jordan Costa provided excellent research assistance. All
remaining errors are my own.
1. See generally Roger C. Cramton, George M. Cohen & Susan P. Koniak, Legal
and Ethical Duties of Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VILL. L. Rv. 725 (2004).
2. See Letter from Professors Susan P. Koniak, Roger C. Cramton & George M.
Cohen, to Securities and Exchange Commission (Apr. 7, 2003), available at http://
www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/lawprofsO4O7O3.htm (commenting on im-
plementation of SEC standards of professional conduct for attorneys); Letter from
Professors Susan P. Koniak, Roger C. Cramton & George M. Cohen, to Securities
and Exchange Commission (Dec. 17, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/riles/
proposed/s74502/skoniakl.htm (same).
3. See generally Indep. Exam'r Report, SEC v. Spiegel, Inc., No. 03C-1685, 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17933 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 5, 2003), at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/276641/000094787103002136/0000947871-03-002136.txt.
4. See generally Letter from Edwin David Robertson, Chair, Task Force on Cor-
porate Responsibility, New York County Lawyer's Association, to Securities and Ex-
change Commission (Apr. 1, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
proposed/s74502/edrobertson 1 .htm.
5. See infra Part II.
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noisy withdrawal, there is little to be gained from rehashing the already
copious arguments against that provision.
6
Instead, I want to follow in the tradition of many symposium com-
ments, which effectively say, "the principal paper was interesting, but this
is what I really want to talk about." What I really want to talk about is the
SEC as an institution. What institutional features may impact the SEC's
willingness or ability to enforce these lawyer conduct rules vigorously in
the future? This kind of institutional analysis is important because one of
the primary justifications for requiring the SEC to promulgate and enforce
these reporting rules is the perceived failure of state bar authorities to
discipline transactional lawyers. 7 This Comment suggests, however, that
with respect to enforcing professional responsibility rules the SEC shares
many characteristics with state bar authorities and that it is therefore rea-
sonable to expect a very similar pattern of enforcement.
This prediction is not meant to suggest that Section 307 is unlikely to
yield any benefits. Indeed, the SEC's new reporting rules seem to have
had a salutary effect already because they appear to have substantially in-
fluenced the ABA's amendments to Model Rules 1.6 and 1.13.8 The mere
presence of these lawyer reporting rules-especially in a post-Enron envi-
ronment where courts and regulators may be less willing to believe that
lawyers were simply innocent bystanders-will likely cause more lawyers to
report illegal acts up the ladder, even if the prospect for a disciplinary
proceeding is remote. If such an increase in up-the-ladder reporting oc-
curs, it may lessen the impact of financial wrongdoing at publicly traded
companies. Thus, Section 307 may have important benefits even in a low-
enforcement environment.
This Comment proceeds as follows. Part I takes an agency-wide per-
spective and focuses on the SEC's budget and personnel constraints and
the already enormous demands on the SEC's scarce resources. Part II
sketches the potential influence of cultural norms, constraints and staff
6. See, e.g., Evan A. Davis, Past Efforts and Future Possibilities: The Meaning of
Professional Independence, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1281, 1283 (2003) (criticizing noisy
withdrawal as moving "in a very wrong direction"); Jill E. Fisch & Kenneth M. Ro-
sen, Is There a Role for Lawyers in Preventing Future Enrons?, 48 ViLL. L. Rrv. 1097,
1138 (2003) (asserting doubts about ability of "mandatory reporting up" to pre-
vent future corporate governance scandals and arguing that new requirement is
"unlikely to change lawyer behavior substantially").
7. Congress was quite explicit about this connection. In debating Section
307, Senator Michael Enzi stated:
I am usually in the camp that believes that States should regulate profes-
sionals within their jurisdiction. However, in this case, the State bars as a
whole have failed. They have provided no specific ethical rule of conduct
to remedy this kind of situation. Even if they do have a general rule that
applies, it often goes unenforced.
148 CONG. REc. S6554-56 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Enzi).
8. See generally Cramton, Cohen & Koniak, supra note 1 (comparing SEC ethi-
cal rules to revised ABA Model Rules).
852 [Vol. 49: p. 851
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incentives on future enforcement efforts in this area. Brief concluding
remarks follow.
II. BUDGET AND PERSONNEL CONSTRAINTS AT THE SEC
In support of rigorous federally based standards of lawyer conduct,
Professor Koniak has argued elsewhere that state bar authorities are un-
likely to reliably enforce ethics rules against "big-time securities or corpo-
rate lawyer[s]," in part because bar authorities are "notoriously under-
funded and under-staffed."9 There is little basis for disputing these con-
tentions. Ample empirical evidence supports the view that lawyers at large
prestigious firms are rarely the targets of disciplinary proceedings-most
state bar disciplinary proceedings involve solo practitioners and small firm
lawyers.10 Money, or the lack thereof, is certainly part of the story. Gener-
ally, state bar authorities are on tight budgets and do not have the staff or
budgets to pursue complex transactional cases. 11
Unfortunately for proponents of a substantial SEC role in enforcing
professional responsibility standards, the SEC faces similar budgetary con-
straints despite its recent large increases in budget allocations. The SEC is
certainly better funded and has more expertise in securities matters than
state bar authorities. But a short review of the resources available to the
SEC and its oversight responsibilities in the securities markets suggests
that it too may not have sufficient funding to provide the kind of sus-
tained, rigorous oversight of the entire corporate and securities bar that
proponents of an active SEC role appear to contemplate.
The SEC (with a staff of a little over 3,000) oversees 9 national securi-
ties exchanges, the over-the-counter market, 70 alternative trading sys-
tems, 12 registered clearing agencies, 8,000 registered broker-dealers that
employ over 700,000 registered representatives, 8,000 transfer agents,
9. Susan P. Koniak, Law and Truth: Roundtable, The Lawyer's Responsibility to the
Truth, 26 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 195, 215 (2003) [hereinafter Koniak, Law and
Truth] (noting that "[i] ncreasing the funding for bar counsel's offices is simply not
a viable plan because bringing even a single case or disciplinary proceeding against
a big-time corporate law firm would be too difficult and would quickly eat up
whatever extra money the state had added to the bar counsel's budget"). The
authors make the same argument here. See generally Cramton, Cohen & Koniak,
supra note 1.
10. See generally RicHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAwYERs 144-45 (1989); Office of
the State Bar of California Chief Trial Counsel, Correlation of Firm Size and Practice
Area with Complaints Received and Action Taken, in DEMOGRAPHIC AND PROFESSIONAL
CHARACTERISTICS OF CALIFORNIA ATTORNEYS 15 (1997).
11. See ABEL, supra note 10, at 148-49 (discussing state resources). Lack of
resources, however, is not the only reason why disciplinary actions appear to be
concentrated among small firms. Other factors seem to play a role as well, such as
the frequency of certain professional breaches among small firms and the lack of
support systems at such firms. See Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law
Firms?, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1992) (describing factors that prevent discipli-
nary actions against large firms); Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of
Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REv. 721, 756 n.119 (2001) (noting that most disciplinary
proceedings are against small firms).
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5,000 investment companies, 7,400 investment advisers and 14,000 issu-
ers. 12 To be sure, the SEC does not have sole responsibility over these
entities and individuals-self-regulatory agencies and state securities com-
missioners play an important oversight role as well. But the SEC remains
the lead regulator in the securities markets and it continues to face addi-
tional demands on its budgetary and staff resources. For example, in just
the last few months, there have been calls for increased SEC oversight of
mutual and hedge funds.1 3
Until 2002 and the increased budget resources that came with the
passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, 14 the SEC was on a starvation diet. Through-
out the 1990s, as the securities markets became larger, more complex and
increasingly global, and as financial engineers churned out increasingly
more exotic instruments, the Commission's resources lagged farther and
farther behind its workload. Prior to 1993, available staff resources kept
pace with increases in the SEC's workload, but then largely remained flat
throughout the remainder of the decade while workload increased tre-
mendously. From 1992 through 2000, registered representatives under
SEC supervision swelled from 427,000 to approximately 683,000 while the
value of exchange-listed stock grew from $3.97 to $11.73 trillion.' 5 Over-
all, from 1990 through 2000, the SEC's enforcement staff grew by only
16% while the number of complaints grew 100%.16 The percentage of
corporate filings that received a full or partial review dropped from 21%
in 1990 to 8% in 2000.17
The end result was that by 2000, resource constraints had contributed
to substantial delays in the SEC's rulemaking and oversight activities and
had forced the Commission to be both more selective and slower in com-
pleting its enforcement efforts.18 The SEC lobbied for larger budgets to
avert these problems, but its pleas for increased funding during the 1990s
12. See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, GAO-02-302, SEC Operations: Increased
Workload Creates Challenges 3 (Mar. 2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.
items/d02302.pdf [hereinafter GAO, SEC Operations].
13. See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, Funds Under Suspicion: The Overview, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 4, 2003, at Al (describing bipartisan congressional criticism of lack of SEC
oversight of mutual fund industry); Leslie Wayne, Congress to Debate Greater Oversight
of Hedge Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1998, at C1 (noting criticism of lack of SEC
regulation of hedge funds); see also SEC, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE
FUNDS 12 (2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.
pdf ("[T]he Commission should consider regulatory and other measures to im-
prove the current system of hedge fund regulation and oversight.").
14. See generally Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745
(2002).
15. SeeJOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 630-
31 (3d ed. 2003).
16. See GAO, SEC Operations, supra note 12, at 13-14.
17. See id. at 22.
18. See id.
854 [Vol. 49: p. 851
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were largely ignored.' 9 Particularly in the latter half of the 1990s, the SEC
was saddled with no-growth budgets and personnel freezes.
20
These funding problems contributed to substantial staffing problems.
Staff turnover, driven in part by large pay differentials between the SEC
and other financial regulators, 21 is higher at the SEC than elsewhere in
the government. In 2000, the turnover rate among attorneys, accountants
and other professionals at the SEC was 15%, about twice the rate for
equivalent positions outside of the SEC.22 About one third of the SEC's
staff left between 1998 and 2000.23 Among other problems, this high turn-
over rate has a negative impact on the SEC's enforcement efforts because
it creates a more inexperienced staff and slows down investigations and
case processing, as new attorneys are trained or get up to speed on pend-
ing cases.
The SEC's traditional inability to fill vacant positions quickly exacer-
bates turnover problems. For example, in September 2001, the SEC had
approximately 280 vacant positions. 24 The SEC's staffing problems appear
to have flowed in part from the different funding mechanisms among fi-
nancial regulators. Unlike the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the
SEC is not self-funded.2 5 Instead, the Commission is part of the normal
federal budgeting process.
Are these budget and staffing problems a thing of the past? I suspect
not. While Sarbanes-Oxley did increase the size of the SEC's budget,
26 it
19. See SELIGMAN, supra note 15, at 630-39.
20. See id.
21. See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, GAO-01-947, Securities and Exchange
Commission: Human Capital Challenges Require Management Attention 2 (Sept.
2001), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01947.pdf (noting that SEC
staff earn 18-39% less than comparable staff at other federal financial regulators).
22. See id. at 1.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. Self-funded banking regulators are funded from fees and assessments as
well as earnings on investments. See GAO, SEC Operations, supra note 12, at 29
n.34. Self-funding is feasible at the SEC, as it typically collects fees that are well in
excess of its annual budgetary allocations. For example, in 2000, the SEC collected
$2.271 billion in fees, about 6 times more than its budget of $370 million. See 2000
SEC ANN. REP. 158, available at http://www.sec.gov/pdf/annrep00/ar0Ofull.pdf.
Not surprisingly, those fees generally keep pace with increases in the SEC's wor-
kload. Although former Chairman Arthur Levitt sought to move the SEC to a self-
funding model, he was unable to do so and ultimately concluded that Congress
was unwilling to relinquish budgetary authority over the agency because doing so
would give Congress far less control over the SEC's actions. See SELIGMAN, supra
note 15, at 632.
26. The Act increased SEC appropriations for fiscal year 2003 to $776 million,
a 66% increase from the $466.9 million in President Bush's original budget propo-
sal. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78kk (2003). About 30% of that increase was
earmarked to add 200 employees for auditor oversight and to improve the Com-
mission's "investigative and disciplinary effort." Id. Another third of the increase
was slated to raise the pay of SEC employees to levels commensurate with other
2004] 855
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is by no means certain in a time of increased budget deficits and shifting
spending priorities (i.e., the war on terrorism, Iraq, homeland security)
that the SEC can count on those budget increases in the future. Indeed,
prior to the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, the president's initial budget pro-
posal for 2003 did not fund an enacted pay parity law that would have
increased SEC staff salaries to levels commensurate with staff at other fi-
nancial regulators.2 7 Even after Sarbanes-Oxley's increased appropria-
tions, budget negotiations between the president and Congress showed
the same kind of political wrangling as in past years. 28 Also, even with the
increases now in place, the SEC has still had significant difficulty filling
authorized positions with qualified individuals. 29 Thus, like any govern-
mental enforcement authority, the SEC will have to carefully allocate its
resources in order to maximize deterrence.
Will the SEC allocate substantial resources to attorney disciplinary ac-
tions? A number of factors suggest that such an allocation is unlikely, at
least in the foreseeable future. The SEC faces enormous pressure from
Congress and other constituencies to bring enforcement actions involving
the primary actors in Enron and other recent scandals; it is reasonable to
assume that, at least in the short term, the SEC will concentrate its en-
forcement resources there. Over the long term, I think Professors Cram-
ton, Cohen and Koniak are right that the SEC has virtually assured low-
financial regulators. See id. The SEC was to use the remaining increase for tech-
nology and security enhancements and for expenses related to September 11,
2001. See id.
27. See generally Investor & Capital Markets Fee Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 107-
123, 115 Stat. 2390 (2002); Floyd Norris, Will S.E.C. 's Needs Be Met? Not by Bush, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 8, 2002, at CI ("Congress finally passed legislation last year to pay
S.E.C. people what bank regulators are paid, but President Bush's new budget pro-
vided no money for pay parity or for hiring a single additional accountant.").
28. Despite the $776 million that Sarbanes-Oxley authorized for the SEC's
budget, President Bush's first budget proposal, citing other drains on resources
such as increased military spending and security against terrorism, requested only
$568 million in funding, which was about 27% less than authorized. See Stephen
Labaton, Bush Tries to Shrink S.E.C. Raise Intended for Corporate Cleanup, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 19, 2002, at Al. Democrats pushed for a budget increase in line with the
Sarbanes-Oxley authorization and argued that the administration was reneging on
its earlier commitment because corporate scandals had moved off the front pages
of the newspaper. See id.; see also Kathleen Day, SEC Funds Get Snarled in Dispute;
Hill Democrats Want Bigger Boost than Bush, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 2002, at El. The
administration eventually bowed to political pressure and said it would seek a
budget for the SEC of $842 million, 92% larger than the SEC's budget from the
previous year. See Stephen Labaton, Bush Proposes Big Increase in S.E. C. Budget, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 3, 2003, at Cl.
29. See GAO, SEC Operations, supra note 12, at 5 (remarking that "more re-
mains to be done in order for [the] SEC to strategically align its core mission with
its ability to recruit and retain qualified employees); Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Chief
Says Fixing the Agency Will Take Time, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2003, at Cl (quoting SEC
Chairman William Donaldson as remarking that new funding "present[s] chal-
lenges" in terms of hiring staff who do not just "increase head count" but also "can
perform the vital tasks that we assign to them").
[Vol. 49: p. 851
ENFORCEMENT OF REPORTING RULES
level enforcement by adopting its convoluted triggering mechanism for
up-the-ladder reporting.30
It is possible, of course, to argue that vigorously enforcing up-the-lad-
der reporting rules and requiring noisy withdrawal will actually conserve
resources in the long run by effectively enlisting lawyers as additional
monitors of client misbehavior.3 1 Empirical studies of deterrence strongly
suggest that, all other things being equal, increased monitoring (which
increases the chances that unlawful activities will be detected) has a
greater deterrent impact than enhanced sanctions.3 2 As suggested earlier,
even if enforcement activity does not increase significantly, the mere pres-
ence of Section 307 and the amendments to the ABA Model Rules are
likely to cause more lawyers to report evidence of illegal acts up the lad-
der. But the question remains-is the SEC likely to make disciplining law-
yers an enforcement priority? Answering that question requires us to take
a somewhat closer look at the institutional features of the SEC as an en-
forcement agency.
III. SEC ENFORCEMENT OF ATTORNEY PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. A
BRIEF ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONAL INCENTIVES
AND CONSTRAINTS
The case for augmenting the SEC's role in disciplining lawyers is pre-
mised largely on the inadequacies of state bar authorities. The standard
critique, in addition to highlighting the funding problems previously dis-
cussed, paints a picture of generally lax and inconsistent enforcement of
professional responsibility standards. When they were first formed, state
bar authorities rarely enforced professional responsibility rules. 33 Al-
though disciplinary actions have increased over time, they tend to follow
distinct patterns. Most actions are brought against individual lawyers in
small law firms or solo practitioners; large firm lawyers are rarely subject to
30. See Cramton, Koniak & Cohen, supra note 1 at _. See generally Susan P.
Koniak, When the Hurlyburly's Done: The Bar's Struggle with the SEC, 103 COLUM. L.
REv. 1236, 1275 (2003) [hereinafter Koniak, Hurlyburly].
31. See, e.g.,John C. Coffee,Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC,
103 COLUM. L. REv. 1293, 1294 (2003). Many commentators disagree; they suggest
that clients are less likely to confide in lawyers if attorney-client privilege rules are
relaxed. See, e.g., Fisch & Rosen, supra note 6, at 1138 (arguing that SEC "provision
threatens to undermine the flow of information between lawyers and corporate
actors"); LawrenceJ. Fox, It Takes More Than Cheek to Lose Our Way, 77 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 277, 283 (2003).
32. See Erling Eide, Economics of Criminal Behavior, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW &
ECONOMics 345, 359 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000) (review-
ing literature); see also JAMES Q. WILSON & RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND
HUMAN NATURE 398 (1985); Jeffrey Grogger, Certainty vs. Severity of Punishment, 29
ECON. INQUIRY 297, 304 (1991). See generally Isaac Ehrlich, Participation in Illegiti-
mate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation, 81 J. POL. ECON. 521 (1973).
33. See ABEL, supra note 10, at 143, 145-46.
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discipline.34 Most complaints are dismissed with apparently little investi-
gation.3 5 The matters in which state bar authorities actually bring discipli-
nary actions typically involve obvious professional lapses, such as
mishandling of client funds.36 A large percentage of disbarments involve
clear-cut cases of lawyer misconduct or unfitness, such as those involving
lawyers with felony convictions.3 7
What is most striking about this critique (at least to this securities pro-
fessor) is that it could equally describe most of the SEC's own history in
enforcing professional responsibility standards against attorneys. In a
highly condensed form, that history goes something like this. Since its
second year of operation (1935), the SEC has had the power under Rule
102(e) of its Rules of Practice to suspend or disbar attorneys from appear-
ing or practicing before the Commission if they engage in improper pro-
fessional conduct.38 Like state bar authorities, in the earliest days, the
Commission did not exercise its power to discipline attorneys. In the first
fifteen years of its existence, Rule 102 (e) was used only in disciplinary pro-
ceedings against accountants and other non-legal professionals appearing
before the Commission. It was not until 1950 that the SEC used Rule
102(e) to suspend an attorney from practicing before the SEC.39
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, there was a similar low level of activity.40
Things changed in the 1970s. Under the direction of Irving Pollack
and his successor as head of the Enforcement Division, Stanley Sporkin,
the Commission shifted from generally low to more vigorous enforce-
ment.41 In those cases which were brought under what the Enforcement
Division termed an "access theory" of securities enforcement, 42 the Com-
mission articulated a vision of Rule 102(e) that is remarkably similar to
34. See id. at 144-45; Schneyer, supra note 11, at 7-8 (reporting that
"[p] roceedings against lawyers in large or even medium-sized firms are very rare");
cf DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OFJUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFES-
SION 159 (2000) (noting that "[m]any disciplinary agencies also are reluctant to
pursue powerful bar leaders").
35. See, e.g., ABEL, supra note 10, at 147.
36. See id. at 150-51. Professors Cramton, Cohen and Koniak report that they
are unaware of any disciplinary proceedings brought against lawyers who failed to
report up the ladder. See Cramton, Cohen & Koniak, supra note 1, at _.
37. See ABEL, supra note 10, at 145, 148; RHODE, supra note 34, at 159.
38. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (2003). The predecessor to Rule 102(e) was
adopted in only the SEC's second year of operation. See generally SEC R. PRAc. 11 (1)
(1935). For ease of exposition, this paper will refer to this rule by its current desig-
nation, Rule 102(e).
39. See In re Fleischmann, Release No. U-115, 37 S.E.C. 832, 832 (1950), 1950
WL 40380.
40. See generally In re Keating, Muething & Klekamp, Exchange Act Release
No. 15982, 47 S.E.C. 95, 109 (1979) (Karmel, Comm'r, dissenting).
41. See id. at 112 (noting that SEC brought in excess of eighty-five cases
against attorneys during 1970s); SELIGMAN, supra note 15, at 540.
42. See generally SEC HISTORICAL SOC'Y, ORAL HISTORIES COMM., ROUNDTABLE
ON ENFORCEMENT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SEC's ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM 1934-
1981 27 (Sept. 25, 2002), available at http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/Mu-
858 [Vol. 49: p. 851
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that expressed by proponents of Section 307. Then, as now, the lawyer was
viewed as a gatekeeper who could be enlisted through the threat of disci-
plinary action to protect shareholders from managerial opportunism. 43
Aggressive access theory enforcement, however, was relatively short-
lived and effectively came to an end in the early 1980s. At that point, the
SEC reverted to its previous pattern; indeed, it formally took the position
that it would only bring Rule 102(e) proceedings against attorneys "if the
alleged misconduct was a violation of established ethical rules at the state
level and had a direct impact on the Commission's internal processes." 44
seum_Papers/Archive_PaperPDFs/SECHSRT_EnfrmntHawke.PDF [hereinaf-
ter HISTORY OF SEC ENFORCEMENT].
43. See In re Fields, Securities Act Release No. 5404, 45 S.E.C. 262, 266 n.20(1973) (finding that SEC's power to suspend attorneys was essential because "the
task of enforcing the securities laws rests in overwhelming measure on the bar's
shoulders" and that SEC, "with its small staff, limited resources, and onerous tasks
is peculiarly dependent on the probity and the diligence of the professionals who
practice before it"); Coffee, supra note 31, at 1310-15. The rhetoric then and now
is remarkably similar. Enforcement Division Director Sporkin explained the access
approach:
The Commission has found that the impact of its enforcement efforts is
best maximized by concentrating those efforts on the strategic access
points to our securities market. What I am describing is an "access" ap-
proach to enforcement.
We all recognize that a major securities fraud cannot be perpetrated
by a corporation, its officers and directors without access to our financial
markets .... [S]ystematized frauds frequently depend on the coopera-
tion, intentional or otherwise, of professionals such as lawyers and public
accountants. Many of the most egregious frauds of the past few years-
frauds resulting in losses to investors of hundreds of millions of dollars-
have involved the full panoply of professional participation.
HISTORY OF SEC ENFORCEMENT, supra note 42, at 27 (quoting Stanley Sporkin, SEC
Enforcement Practices Against Corporations, Speech to the Corporate Counsel In-
stitute (Oct. 7, 1976)). As Yogi Berra might say, "It's dejA vu all over again."
44. 10 Louis Loss &JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 4883 (3d ed. rev.
1996). A full discussion of the reasons underlying this shift back to relatively infre-
quent enforcement is beyond the scope of this paper. In part, this shift had to do
with active opposition by the securities bar to the SEC's role in this area. See
Koniak, Hurlyburly, supra note 30, at 1260 (describing securities bar's criticism of
SEC's role in setting and enforcing professional responsibility standards). In part,
it had to do with discomfort with the dual role the SEC was playing of prosecutor
and attorney disciplinarian. See generally In re Keating, Muething & Klekamp, 47
S.E.C. at 109 (Karmel, Comm'r, dissenting). And, in part it had to do with a shift
in personnel at the SEC and the departure of some of the key access theory cham-
pions. See Coffee, supra note 31, at 312-14 (detailing personnel changes at SEC);
see also PHILIP P. HEYMANN, THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 12-15 (1987)
(discussing critical role that agency executives play in changing administrative pri-
orities); JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES Do AND
WHY THEY Do IT 218-32 (1990) (same). Simply put, when a discretionary enforce-
ment program runs counter to the norms and incentives of the agency's staff
(something I address in a bit more detail below) and faces active opposition by
powerful interest groups, it is only natural that the agency's enthusiasm for the
program will wane when that influential champion leaves the agency. Although
such a champion might emerge at the SEC, I think that individuals that can over-
come an agency's inherent constraints and biases are relatively rare. As a result, I
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Since then, nearly all Rule 102(e) proceedings against lawyers have in-
volved actual securities law violations, 45 a pattern that is quite consistent
with state bar disciplinary proceedings against lawyers with felony convic-
tions.46 Like state bar authorities, the SEC has tended to bring these pro-
ceedings against solo practitioners or lawyers from small firmS. 4 7 Thus,
except for the period of aggressive enforcement in the 1970s, the SEC's
enforcement of disciplinary rules against lawyers has looked remarkably
similar to state bar authorities' enforcement efforts.
These similarities are not mere coincidence. State bar authorities and
the SEC are both bureaucracies that share a common set of cultural norms
and institutional constraints. First, from its inception and throughout its
history, the SEC has been a lawyer-dominated agency.48 Lawyer domina-
tion does not mean knee-jerk protectionism. It is far too facile to suggest
that a lawyer-dominated agency will simply look out for its own and never
bring actions against attorneys. At least at the SEC, the historical evidence
shows that lawyers do not get a free pass; they are frequently defendants in
SEC actions, particularly actions alleging insider trading violations. 4 9 That
being said, however, lawyers' professional norms and experiences are
likely to have a profound impact when it comes to enforcing professional
responsibility rules that SEC staffers may consider to be outside of the
agency's core mission (to protect investors by vigorously enforcing disclo-
sure obligations). Professor Koniak has suggested that client confidential-
ity and zealous advocacy are "constitutional" norms for lawyers-core
values that lawyers treat as nearly inviolable. 50 As a result, disclosing client
fraud is subordinate to the central norm of maintaining confidentiality. 5 1
The attorney commissioners and staffers, many of whom practiced as se-
believe that the pattern of SEC attorney discipline that prevailed through approxi-
mately sixty of the SEC's seventy years is the best long-term predictor of the SEC's
future behavior.
45. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 44, at 4883-84; see also Disciplinary Pro-
ceedings Involving Professionals Appearing or Practicing Before the Commission,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-25893, 53 Fed. Reg. 26427 (July 13, 1988) ("The
great majority of Rule [102(e)] proceedings against attorneys involve allegations of
violations of law (not of professional standards); thus, the Commission, as a matter
of policy, generally refrains from using its administrative forum to conduct de novo
determinations of the professional obligations of attorneys.").
46. See ABEL, supra note 10, at 145 (noting that many disbarments involve at-
torneys with felony convictions).
47. See, e.g., In re Fleischmann, Release No. U-115, 37 S.E.C. 832, 832 (1950),
1950 WL 40380.
48. See HOMER KRjPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN
SEARCH OF A PURPOSE 18 (1979).
49. See, e.g., United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 648 (1997) (discussing
indictment against attorney for insider trading); SEC v. Fehn, 97 F.3d 1276, 1286
(9th Cir. 1996) (describing SEC enforcement action against attorney for aiding
and abetting securities fraud).
50. See generally Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C.
L. REv. 1389, 1411 (1992).
51. See Koniak, Hurlyburly, supra note 30, at 1250.
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curities lawyers before joining the SEC, share the very same professional
norms advanced by Professor Koniak.
In this regard, the SEC or state bar authorities are no different from
other administrative agencies staffed by professionals. Professionals (not
just lawyers, but economists, engineers and others) within agencies often
receive incentives (in terms of status, deference and post-government em-
ployment opportunities) from "organized groups of fellow practitioners
located outside the agency."5 2 It is, thus, unsurprising that the SEC would
vigorously enforce insider trading rules against attorneys because such ac-
tivity is both at the core of the SEC's investor protection mission and bla-
tantly breaches a lawyer's confidentiality norm. At the same time, finding
a plausible interpretation that supports a client's disclosure decision or
transaction structure is at the heart of the zealous advocacy norm, and we
should not be surprised that the SEC would be less willing to discipline
lawyers for that activity.
As lawyers themselves, the SEC staff is also likely to be more acutely
attuned to the hindsight bias problem implicated in determining after the
fact what a lawyer must have known. Cognitive psychologists have repeat-
edly found that people reviewing a set of facts ex post consistently exagger-
ate what could have been anticipated ex ante. In other words, when
individuals know an outcome, they tend to believe "that others should
have been able to anticipate events much better than was actually the
case."
5 3
Hindsight bias has obvious implications for enforcement of up-the-
ladder reporting rules. 54 To be sure, Professor Koniak argues that lawyers
never "know" that their clients are acting improperly,5 5 and there is cer-
tainly some truth to that position. Lawyers, just like anyone else, can con-
veniently delude themselves about the existence of improper activities,
particularly where they have a strong financial incentive to do so. 5 6 But it
is also true that it is all too easy in hindsight to say that a lawyer "must have
known" of client misbehavior, when, in reality, at the time the lawyer was
52. WILSON, supra note 44, at 60. Wilson states further:
[T]he behavior of a professional in a bureaucracy is not wholly deter-
mined by incentives controlled by the agency ... [blecause the behavior
of the professional is not entirely shaped by the organizational incentives,
the way such a person defines his or her task may reflect more the stan-
dards of the external reference group than the preferences of the inter-
nal management.
Id.
53. JeffreyJ. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory ofJudging in Hindsight, 65
U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 572 (1998).
54. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAw AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING
303 (3d ed. 1999) ("The fact-finder, knowing that the fraud took place, will be
inclined to exaggerate the degree to which the lawyer was aware of the client's
fraudulent purpose or knowingly assisted in its accomplishment.").
55. See Koniak, Law and Truth, supra note 9, at 212.
56. See Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry into
Lawyers' Responsibility for Clients'Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REv. 75, 98 (1993).
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acting, the facts may have appeared much less clear.5 7 Moreover, con-
structing a positive initial image of a client and then clinging to that initial
impression, even in the light of apparently inconsistent evidence, is not
necessarily venal. Again, cognitive psychology teaches that once humans
(and, despite some suggestions to the contrary, lawyers are human) con-
struct schema (i.e., mental representations used to process incoming
data), they are generally reluctant to alter them. 58
While lawyers at the SEC are not immune from the hindsight bias
problem, 59 they are likely to have a greater familiarity with the indetermi-
nate context in which securities lawyers advise clients on, for example, dis-
closure issues and, therefore, may be reluctant to bring disciplinary
proceedings against them.60 It is, thus, not surprising to see bar officials
and SEC enforcement attorneys focusing their disciplinary efforts almost
exclusively on the most egregious cases (such as stealing client funds or
insider trading), where such uncertainties are less of a concern. And to
the extent that the SEC has admonished or disciplined lawyers for report-
ing failures, it has generally been in cases with compelling facts that
strongly suggest lawyer knowledge of client misbehavior. 61
This implicit recognition of the hindsight bias problem may also ex-
plain why the SEC adopted such a convoluted triggering mechanism for
up-the-ladder reporting. As Professors Cramton, Cohen and Koniak dis-
cuss, under the rule as adopted, the lawyer's reporting obligation is only
triggered if the lawyer becomes aware of "credible evidence, based upon
which it would be unreasonable, under the circumstances, for a prudent
and competent attorney not to conclude that it is reasonably likely that a
material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur." 62 If the
presence of hindsight bias suggests a significant risk of lawyer discipline in
situations in which the lawyer did not know of a client's wrongdoing, then
adopting a convoluted and difficult standard is a way of ensuring that dis-
57. See Fox, supra note 31, at 284.
58. See Langevoort, supra note 56, at 101.
59. Cf Rachlinski, supra note 53, at 580-81 nn.29-30 (collecting studies find-
ing presence of hindsight bias in number of populations, including federal judges
and auditors).
60. See RHODE, supra note 34, at 160 ("Many of thejudges and bar leaders who
regulate the regulators have a 'there but for the grace of God go I' attitude toward
all but the most serious misconduct.").
61. See SEC v. Nat'l Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 685-713 (D.D.C.
1978) (when accountants at closing refused to provide required comfort letter and
instead detailed material misstatements in financials, court held that "significance
of the information clearly removes any doubt concerning [attorneys' knowledge
of] the materiality of the information,"); In re Gutfreund, Exchange Act Release
No. 34-31554, 51 S.E.C. 93, 95 (1992) (finding that chief legal officer of broker-
dealer was aware of false bid submitted in Treasury auction, advised that facts be
disclosed to government and knew that management had not disclosed
information).
62. 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(e) (2003).
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cipline will be imposed only in cases in which the lawyer really did know. 63
To be sure, such a standard is a second-best solution. It would be far pref-
erable for enforcement attorneys to assess hindsight bias accurately in in-
dividual cases, but expecting that kind of accuracy is unrealistic. Given the
drafters' professional norms and the centrality of the confidentiality prin-
ciple, it is unsurprising to see them adopt a standard that will tend to
under- rather than over-discipline attorneys for reporting failures.
In addition to these professional norms, it is also important to recog-
nize that normal prosecutorial preferences will impact SEC enforcement
attorneys' decisions whether to bring disciplinary actions. In deciding
which cases to bring, the Commission will certainly focus on the potential
benefits of enforcement, such as whether enforcement will have an impor-
tant deterrent impact. 64 Thus, a high-profile case against a prestigious law
firm that is likely to generate substantial press coverage has obvious ap-
peal. But that kind of case is a double-edged sword, both because of the
downside risk associated with losing a high-profile case and because such
cases are likely to require greater staff resources to prosecute. Particularly
when it comes to bringing the first test cases, the Commission is likely to
have a strong preference for cases in which there is clear evidence that the
lawyer violated his or her reporting obligations. In other words, we are
likely to continue to see the same pattern we saw before Sarbanes-Oxley-
cases in which the violation of the SEC's Rules of Practice is essentially an
add-on to a claim that the lawyers were themselves engaged in securities
violations. 6
5
The same conclusion flows from an analysis of the incentives of the
staff enforcement attorneys. As the previously discussed turnover data sug-
gest, typical SEC enforcement staffers are young attorneys who spend only
a few years at the SEC before pursuing more lucrative careers in private
practice, often at large prestigious law firms. 66 While one way to enhance
career advancement within the agency and post-government employment
opportunities is to bring high profile cases,67 attorneys may, quite frankly,
be leery of bringing disciplinary proceedings against lawyers from the kind
of firms that they hope to join in the future. 68 The reluctance to bring a
63. See Rachlinski, supra note 53, at 575 (describing how courts employ legal
standards, such as business judgment rule, to compensate for effects of hindsight
bias).
64. See SUSAN P. SHAPIRO, WAYWARD CAPITALISTS: TARGET OF THE SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 150-51 (1984).
65. See Zacharias, supra note 11, at 760 ("As a practical matter, faced with no
shortage of other cases involving professional misconduct, the authorities may pre-
fer to use their limited resources to dispose of a greater number of easier cases.").
66. See SHAPIRO, supra note 64, at 141-42.
67. See ROBERT A. KATZMANN, REGULATORY BUREAUCRACY: THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION AND ANTITRUST POLICY 71 (1980); Arthur Maass, U.S. Prosecution of
State and Local Officials for Political Corruption, 17 PUBLIUS 195, 222-27 (1987).
68. While this concern is understandable, it is by no means clear that this
kind of proceeding would inhibit future job prospects. High profile prosecutions,
even if they are contrary to interests of industry, could make lucrative industryjobs
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disciplinary proceeding against a lawyer, however, may be lessened if the
subject of the disciplinary proceeding can be portrayed as a rogue attorney
who clearly was acting outside the norms of the profession, or if the attor-
ney is a solo practitioner or member of a small firm. Again, it seems that
staff attorneys will display the same preferences they have in the past-
they will prefer to bring only the most egregious actions, especially if the
lawyers involved are from less prestigious firms.
An obvious example of this kind of enforcement pattern is the recent
history of enforcement under Section 10A of the Securities Exchange
Act.69 Adopted as part of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995,70 Section 10A imposes a reporting duty on auditors similar to the
Section 307 requirements. 7 1 Section 10A requires auditors to report to
the SEC illegal acts that have a material impact on financial statements if
management or the board fails to take appropriate remedial action after
being notified of those acts.72 Despite record levels of accounting restate-
ments and a substantial number of SEC enforcement actions that allege
accounting improprieties, 73 the SEC has only received twenty-nine Section
10A reports since the provision has taken effect.7 4 Although it would
seem that there would be many opportunities for the SEC to pursue cases
against accountants for failure to comply with their reporting obligations,
through mid-2003, the SEC had brought only seven actions alleging that
auditors violated the reporting requirements of Section 10A.7 5 Most of
these actions, as would have been predicted from an analysis of the norms
and constraints of the staff, involved accountants from smaller, less prestig-
ious firms who appear to have either known or been complicit in obvious
financial misreporting.76 For the most part, the alleged Section 10A viola-
more attainable because they demonstrate talent and energy. See WILSON, supra
note 44, at 86. Nonetheless, when a lawyer's own future earnings potential is on
the line, the attorney may be risk averse.
69. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (1995).
70. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.).
71. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1.
72. See id. § 78j-1 (3).
73. During fiscal year 2002, the SEC's Division of Enforcement processed six
hundred enforcement cases, 23% of which involved accounting or auditing issues.
See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, GAO-03-982R, Securities Exchange Act: Review of
Reporting Under Section 10A 4 (Sept. 3, 2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d03982r.pdf.
74. See id. at 5.
75. See id. at 1.
76. See, e.g., In re Decker, Exchange Act Release No. 47731, 80 SEC Docket 80
(Apr. 24, 2003), 2003 SEC LEXIS 980 (involving improper recording of not yet
consummated merger that permitted issuer to overstate revenues by 177% in situa-
tion in which auditor possessed evidence that management fabricated docu-
ments); In re Ohlhauser, Exchange Act Release No. 47256, 79 SEC Docket 1432
(Jan. 27, 2003), 2003 SEC LEXIS 221 (involving allegation that Canadian auditor
did not report potential illegal act to management even though he reasonably con-
cluded that licensing agreement accounting for 40% of issuer's quarterly profits
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tions appeared to be add-ons to claims that the auditors violated the fed-
eral securities laws. There seems to be no substantial reason to believe
that enforcement under Section 307 will look any different.
IV. CONCLUSION
When it comes to enforcing professional responsibility standards, the
SEC and state bar authorities are subject to similar constraints and incen-
tives and exhibit similar norms. As a result, it is reasonable to expect that
SEC enforcement of the new lawyer reporting rules will look quite similar
to its own past enforcement patterns and the enforcement patterns that
state bar authorities exhibit. But incentives, norms and constraints are not
outcome-determinative. Bureaucracies can overcome these barriers and
change their behavior, broaden their agendas or reconceptualize their
missions. Indeed, one need look no further for evidence of such a change
than the SEC's own treatment of lawyers in the 1970s. Is such a shift back
to vigorous enforcement possible in the future? Anything is possible, but
history teaches us that lasting shifts (particularly those that are at odds
with agency norms, incentives and constraints) are relatively rare. 77 In
this case, past is most likely prologue.
was backdated); SEC v. Skulsky, Litigation Release No. 17407, 77 SEC Docket 306
(Mar. 12, 2002), 2002 SEC LEXIS 547 (involving concurrent civil and criminal
actions against small firm auditors who were implicated in revenue recognition
and manipulation scheme).
77. See WILSON, supra note 44, at 218-32.
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